Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
A key misunderstanding about Iran is the belief that "clerics" hold significant power. This power has been consistently eroded since 1979. There are clerics who have recently been in positions of authority, with the ability to shape state policy, (Rouhani, Taeb, Raisi etc.), but just because these men wear turbans doesn't mean they are acting on behalf of a unified clerical bloc. Clerics continue to have roles in the Iranian state much like how Ivy League graduates have roles in the US government. A common education reflects shared institutional and social ties, but also allows for considerable disagreements in political outlook. Those institutions that are dominated by clerics (eg. The Guardian Council) are vestiges of a revolutionary process and do not have the power to set the policy agenda. Even the Supreme Leader's authority is only partly vested in his role as an Ayatollah. In the contemporary Islamic Republic, his authority is rooted in his "office," the Setad, which has a technocratic function and marshals resources. Even in a so-called "theocracy," power is material, not spiritual. This is why the notion that "military hardliners" are grabbing power from clerics doesn't really make sense. There isn't much power to grab. This framing also obfuscates that the militarization of the Iranian state is actually diminishing the power of Iran's elected politicians, which remains significant. This is the political transformation we ought to be worried about. The fact that Pezeshkian prevailed in the elections against candidates with stronger links to the IRGC reflected an effort to preserve the firewall between the civilian and military parts of the "nezam." The conflict with Israel may undermine this effort. As a final point, it's important that we don't totally conflate "hardliner" with "extremist." Pragmatism has been a consistent through-line in Iranian foreign policy, even as hardliners have consolidated influence in national security decision-making. Sure, there are some messianic extremists among the people we'd consider hardliners. But for the most part, the reason that figures in the IRGC are called hardliners is not because they are inherently irrational or extreme, but because they are committed to an illiberal and socially conservative political project, with growing economic interests. If the militarization of Iran continues, especially through the enforced isolation of sanctions, the likeliest outcome is a garrison state like Egypt or Pakistan, where the military regime reduces the external threat it poses in order to consolidate power domestically. The US has been happy to tolerate many authoritarian, militarized states, even ones that have acquired a nuclear weapon. That's the bet that many Iranian hardliners are likely to make. The war that they want to win is not with the US or Israel. It is a war over the soul of Iran. That's why they will pick their battles.
Gregg Carlstrom
"Military hardliners are grabbing power from clerics. That could mean they try to extricate themselves from the war now in order to fight another day. But in the medium term it could signal that the regime becomes more extreme, not more pragmatic." https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/06/23/fierce-hardliners-are-grabbing-power-in-iran